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1 Introduction
An important strand in recent feminist philosophy of language has been 
guided by the thought that speech is social action, and more specifically 
that the performance of speech acts requires not only a contribution 
from a suitably competent and entitled speaker but also that the speak-
er’s contribution be given a suitable reception or social uptake. Put some-
what crudely, the idea is that, in order to perform a speech act of, say, 
promising, or telling, or warning, a speaker must be taken by others as 
doing so. In this way, speakers are thought to depend profoundly on the 
competence, goodwill, and receptiveness of others—their audiences and 
other relevant parties—in order to exercise their linguistic agency.
The idea that speakers are profoundly dependent in this way on others 
has prompted a lot of discussion about what could be called the poli-
tics of uptake. In particular, feminist philosophers of language working 
within this tradition have highlighted various kinds of injustice that oc-
cur in speech situations. Certain speakers from are said to be “silenced,” 
or to be the victims of “discursive injustice,” on account of the social 
reception their acts routinely receive.1
Though the philosophers working in this field acknowledge the 
broad significance and applicability of this theoretical framework, the 
overwhelming focus of the extant literature is on the ways in which 
the speech of women, in particular, is unjustly disempowered. In this 
chapter, my aim is to explore how unjust uptake impedes the speech 
of a different kind of speaker—Indigenous communities. This involves 
looking focusing on Indigeneity rather than gender as the salient so-
cial identity, and looking at the ways that group speech, rather than 
only individual speech, can be unjustly impeded. I argue that, just as the 
speech of women is often heard in ways that tend to reinforce their dis-
empowerment, so too is the speech of Indigenous communities routinely 
taken in ways that contribute toward their ongoing marginalization and 
disenfranchisement.
In order to make this argument, I adopt a “social normativist” ap-
proach to speech acts. After briefly outlining the framework (Section 2), 
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I show how it has been used by Quill Kukla (writing then as Rebecca 
Kukla) to identify a distinctive phenomenon that they call “discursive 
injustice” (Section 3). I then quite briefly explain how group speech can 
be accommodated within the social normativist framework (Section 4), 
before describing in detail three examples of how discursive injustice 
can effectively derail the speech of Indigenous communities (Section 5).
2 Social Normativism
There are a number of established theoretical frameworks for individu-
ating speech acts, describing what it takes to perform them, and high-
lighting the various ways in which their successful performance can be 
impeded. One that has attracted a lot of attention in recent times is 
the social normativist framework, which has been developed by Robert 
Brandom, Quill Kukla and Mark Lance, and John MacFarlane.2 In this 
chapter, I operate within this framework, drawing primarily on the ver-
sion of it developed by Kukla and Lance (2009).
A key claim of the framework developed by Kukla and Lance is that 
different speech acts can be distinguished on the basis of their normative 
functional profiles: t heir normative “inputs” or entitlement conditions, 
and their normative “outputs,” i.e., what normative effects they have. 
The inputs are the various conventionally required prequalifications and 
preconditions that must be in place in order for the act to be performed 
by a given speaker in a given set of circumstances. (Does this speaker have 
the authority needed to perform this kind of act? Is this the right audience 
and the right setting for this kind of act?) The outputs are the ways the 
speech act changes the normative situation and statuses of the speaker, 
the audience, and others. (What permissions or obligations has the per-
formance of the speech act imposed on the audience? In what ways has 
the speaker made herself accountable and answerable to the audience?)
To see how this works, consider the speech act of naming or baptism. 
A normative “input” for the speech act of naming something is that it 
must be performed by a suitably entitled speaker—one who stands in the 
right relation to the object being named—while its primary normative 
“output” is that it licenses others to refer to the object by that name. 
Similarly, the speech act of enacting legislation can only be performed 
in a certain setting by a suitably authorized body, and its chief norma-
tive import is to impose various duties and entitlements on the citizenry. 
Other speech acts do not require any special authority on the part of the 
speaker, yet they shift normative statuses by licensing certain attitudes 
and behaviors on the part of the audience, and making the speaker an-
swerable to the audience in various ways.
If this combination of normative inputs and outputs of a speech act—
its normative profile or “pragmatic topography”—is what determines 
the sort of speech act it is, this raises the question of what, in turn, the 
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normative statuses that characterize those inputs and outputs depend 
on. Different social normativists spell this out differently, but according 
to Kukla and Lance, the normative functions of language “essentially 
depend on the concrete ways in which speakers are enmeshed in social 
communities and environments” (Kukla and Lance 2009, 2). In others 
words, the force of a speech act depends on the concrete social differ-
ence it characteristically makes—the way the performance of the act 
affects the attitudes and behavioral dispositions of relevant members of 
the speech community. For a speech act to license certain behaviors, for 
example, it must dispose people to act as though such behaviors are li-
censed. If my attempt to re-name my potplant “Greg” does not have the 
effect of getting others to call it “Greg,” and on the contrary everyone 
continues to call it “Jermaine,” then my act has not had the character-
istic normative effect of a naming, and so something has gone wrong 
with my attempt to re-name the potplant. Kukla calls this “materialism” 
about normative statuses:
normative statuses are material social statuses. They cannot exist 
unless they have practical social cash value. Normative statuses su-
pervene on concrete, materially implemented dispositions to act. 
A speech act that does not make a difference to how people are 
actually disposed to behave does not succeed in having a normative 
output at all. A basic commitment to normative status materialism 
implies that speech acts have their performative force only in virtue 
of the concrete social difference that they make, or how they are 
taken up in practice.
(Kukla 2014, 443, emphasis in original)
According to the social normativist, then, the illocutionary status (or 
“performative force”) of a speech act depends to a large extent on the 
act’s social reception. For an act to be an act of naming, say, it needs 
to be socially taken as one, where this “social uptake” is a matter of a 
“concrete social difference” that goes beyond simply recognizing that 
the speaker meant to name something. This marks a sharp contrast with 
intentionalist speech act theoretic frameworks, according to which the 
speaker’s intentions and their recognition by the audience play the deci-
sive role in determining the sort of act she performs, if any. On the social 
normativist framework, the speaker is not a god-like authority when it 
comes to the speech she performs. Instead, the nature of the speaker’s act 
is partly constituted by the uptake it receives.
3 Discursive Injustice
One of the attractive features of this social normativist framework is 
that it is an especially powerful tool for identifying a variety of ways that 
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speech can be unjustly interfered with or impeded. In particular, and 
in contrast to other frameworks that have been used to highlight forms 
of “illocutionary disablement” (Langton 1993), the social normativist 
framework can accommodate cases in which the uptake a speaker’s act 
receives constitutes it as a different kind of act from the act the speaker 
intended.
Traditionally, silencing has been understood in broadly intentionalist 
terms, as something that happens when an audience fails to recognize the 
intentions of the speaker—where such recognition is seen as necessary 
for the successful performance of an illocutionary act.3 So, for example, 
a woman may utter the word “No” with the intention to thereby refuse 
a man’s sexual advances, but because the man is in the grip of a stereo-
type about women (e.g., that they “play coy”) he fails to recognize this 
intention, and so the woman is prevented from successfully performing 
the illocutionary act of refusal. When stereotypes about certain speakers 
reliably produce this kind of uptake failure (the failure of their hearers to 
recognize their illocutionary intentions), the result is a systematic kind 
of illocutionary disablement: certain speech acts become “unspeakable” 
(Langton 1993) for certain speakers in certain situations.
The social normativist framework goes beyond this traditional ap-
proach to silencing, because it construes “uptake” more broadly than 
simply as the recognition by the audience of what the speaker is trying 
to do. As we have seen, for the social normativist, the uptake a speech 
act receives is the way it gets responded to in social practice—the way 
it affects how people are disposed to think and act—and it is this “con-
crete social difference” that plays a key role in constituting a linguistic 
performance as a speech act of one kind or another. This has an im-
portant consequence for thinking about how speech can go awry or 
be unjustly impeded. It means that what act a speaker performs is not 
up to her alone: she may attempt to perform an act of type A and find, 
because of the uptake her act receives, that she has performed an act 
of type B.
Kukla (2014) uses this aspect of social normativist framework to il-
luminate a distinctive phenomenon that they call “discursive injustice.” 
Discursive injustice occurs when speakers with certain social identities 
have their speech systematically distorted in a way that is socially disem-
powering. They illustrate this with several compelling examples of how 
the speech acts of women in certain contexts are taken as—and so con-
stituted as—different acts from those they intended. I will describe these 
examples in some detail later on, but for now what is important to note 
is that, for Kukla, what makes these kinds of pragmatic breakdowns 
injustices rather than simply misfortunes, is that they have a systematic 
connection to the speaker’s disempowered social identity. That is, they 
track and exacerbate the social disempowerment of the salient social 
identity—here, the speaker’s gender identity.
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4 Group Speech
In the next section, I argue that Indigenous communities are sometimes 
subjected to discursive injustice, especially when they attempt to make 
claims or assert their rights in connection with their traditional land. In 
doing so, I focus on a quite different sort of speaker from the kind that 
Kukla focuses on. Not only is there a different social identity in play (In-
digeneity instead of gender), but my focus here is on group speech, rather 
than individual speech. Before discussing these examples, then, it may 
be worth briefly explaining what I take group speech to be, and how I 
think it can be accommodated within a social normativist theoretical 
framework.
By group speech, I mean speech acts that are performed either collec-
tively or via a spokesperson, such that the group itself can be identified 
in the role of the speaker. In our discursive practice we routinely ascribe 
speech acts of various kinds to various kinds of groups. We say that 
the company announced its new product line; that the protest group 
demanded equal pay; that the church apologized for past injustices; that 
the research team asserted that the polar caps are melting, etc. In such 
cases, the speech acts of announcing, demanding, apologizing, and as-
serting are understood as acts that represent and normatively commit 
the whole group. It is the company that needs to follow through on 
its announcement; the protest group that needs to demonstrate entitle-
ment to its demands; the research team that needs to justify its assertion, 
and so on.
Group speech acts can be performed in different ways. One way is 
for the people in the group to coordinate their efforts in the production 
of a unified message or utterance. This is what happens, for example, 
when protestors chant their demands in unison; or when the guests at 
a birthday party sing “happy birthday” to the host. In these cases, the 
various individuals are marshaling their own linguistic know-how, but 
in the performance of a collective act, based on a shared intention. Aside 
from such collectively performed utterances, a different mechanism of 
group speech involves the group recruiting an individual person to speak 
in their collective name. The words of this “spokesperson” are then to be 
counted as the words of the group.4
Recently, several philosophers have explored the phenomenon of 
group speech from within a broadly normativist framework. For exam-
ple, Jennifer Lackey (2018) has argued that an assertion made in the 
name of a group by an authorized spokesperson should be attributed 
to the group rather than the spokesperson—since it is the group, rather 
than the spokesperson, that must satisfy the relevant entitlement condi-
tions. More recently, Grace Paterson (2019) has argued that reflection on 
group speech acts should lead us to embrace “speaker responsibilism”—
the view that the speaker of an act is whoever is made normatively 
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responsible by it. And in a similar vein, Deborah Tollefsen (2020), focus-
ing on group assertion, suggests that group assertion essentially involves 
a distinctive kind of collective commitment, through which the group 
makes itself responsible for answering epistemic challenges.
Regardless of exactly how the details are worked out, I think it is 
clear that a social normativist framework can fairly easily accommodate 
group speech acts. Indeed, in contrast to some other speech act theoretic 
frameworks, such as intentionalism, it appears to have the advantage 
of not placing onerous requirements on the psychological capacities of 
the group. That is, it does not require a group to have a range of mental 
states—intentions, beliefs, or knowledge—in order to perform speech 
acts. Instead, the main requirement is that the group makes use of con-
ventionally recognized arrangements, such as the use of a spokesperson, 
that mark the speech in question as group speech, and that the utterances 
performed in this way receive a certain social uptake, i.e., that they are 
treated in practice as having the relevant sort of normative significance. 
In what follows, I focus on examples of group speech that involve the use 
of an authorized spokesperson.
5 Discursive Injustice and Indigenous Speech
5.1 Imperatives vs. Requests: Nganana Tatintja Wiya
I am now, at last, in a position to describe some of the ways in which 
Indigenous communities suffer discursive injustice. To do this, I will fol-
low Kukla (2014), who gives three detailed examples of discursive injus-
tice, each involving a slightly different dynamic. I will briefly describe 
Kukla’s three examples, and then show that similar dynamics sometimes 
affect the speech of Indigenous communities.
Kukla’s first example of discursive injustice is of a female factory floor 
manager, Celia, who is both authorized and required by her job to issue 
orders to her predominantly male subordinates. Celia seeks to do this 
using standard linguistic conventions, but she finds that her workers gen-
erally do not comply, and moreover think she is ungrateful and a “bitch.” 
Kukla suggests that what is going on in this case is that “even though 
Celia is entitled to issue orders in this context, and however much she 
follows the conventions that typically would mark her speech acts as 
orders, because of her gender her workers take her as issuing requests 
instead” (Kukla 2014, 445–446).
As Kukla points out, there is a key difference between the pragmatic 
structure of requests and orders. An order, when it is entitled and legiti-
mate (e.g., issued by a proper authority), imposes obligations on the ad-
dressee, whereas requests do not: “acknowledging [a request’s] legitimacy 
leaves the one requested free to grant or refuse the request. Granting a 
request is never obligatory” (Kukla 2014, 446).5 As we have seen, on 
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Kukla’s social normativist approach, whether someone has performed an 
order or a request depends in considerable part on the uptake her act 
receives—on whether it is taken up in practice as something that purports 
to impose obligations, or instead as something that the addressee is free to 
grant or refuse. The problem for Celia is that, because her workers are not 
used to being given orders in this context by a women, they do not hear 
and respond to them as orders, but rather as requests. For instance, they 
may fail to comply with what she has told them to do without explaining 
or excusing themselves, and, on the rare occasions that they do comply, 
they may be annoyed that Celia is not grateful (the fulfillment of requests, 
but not orders, calls for gratitude). The result is that Celia’s speech in this 
arena is radically disempowered, with obvious material costs:
No matter how carefully she cleaves to what would normally be the 
conventions for ordering, the local context and discursive practices 
surrounding her speech acts—which will always include the work-
ers’ uptake of and response to the acts—will in fact turn them into 
requests instead.
(Kukla 2014, 446)
A structurally analogous pragmatic breakdown sometimes undermines 
the speech of Indigenous communities, when they attempt to issue orders 
or make rules about activities on their traditional land. Even in cases 
when these communities are acknowledged as the rightful owners or 
custodians of the land, their efforts to forbid certain activities are some-
times taken up as gentle requests or pleas to “respect the local culture”—
pleas which the addressee may decide for himself whether to grant or 
refuse—rather than firm, binding orders issued from a proper authority.
By way of example, consider “the Climb,” a controversial hiking and 
climbing route on Uluṟu, the sandstone monolith in central Australia 
(referred to as “Ayers Rock” by colonial settlers).6 Uluṟu is considered 
sacred by the local Aṉangu Aboriginal community, who since the 1985 
“handback” have been legally and publicly recognized as the owners 
of Uluṟu and the surrounding land. The Climb was located within the 
Uluṟu-Kata Tjuta National Park (UKTNP), a park that is jointly man-
aged by the Aṉangu community and the Australian government agency, 
Parks Australia.
From the time of its construction in 1958 to its closure in 2019, the 
Climb was an extremely popular recreational activity for Australians 
and international tourists. According to the law and traditions of the 
Aṉangu community, however, Uluṟu is a sacred place and visitors are 
strictly forbidden from climbing upon it. Even before the closure of the 
Climb, this was made clear on park signage, as well as other materials 
such as tickets and brochures that bear the message Nganana Tatintja 
Wiya, meaning “We Never Climb.” A particularly clear statement of the 
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community’s stance on visitor climbing was featured in a park visitors 
guide from 2004, in the form of the following statement from an elder of 
the community, Kunmanara:
This is Aṉangu land and we welcome you […] We want our visitors 
to learn about our place and listen to us Aṉangu. Now a lot of vis-
itors are only looking at sunset and climbing Uluṟu. That rock is 
really important and sacred. You shouldn’t climb it! Climbing is not 
a proper tradition for this place.
(Uluṟu-Kata Tjuta National Park Visitor Guide, quoted in James 
2007, 399)
Arguably, this statement meets conventional standards for, and was in-
deed meant as, a group imperative. It was spoken by an authorized el-
der of the community, has the surface form of a typical imperative, and 
it expresses an article of Indigenous law (Tjukurpa). The community, 
speaking through an authorized spokesperson, was saying: don’t climb. 
Moreover, this imperative appears to be perfectly entitled. This is made 
clear in the statement itself: this is our land and you are our visitors—
and as such you should listen to us. Normatively speaking, this is right: 
the Aṉangu are indeed the owners of Uluṟu, and as such should have the 
standing to determine which activities are allowed on it.
Yet what is striking in this case is that this speech act (and similar 
ones) of the community was not really treated as an imperative within 
the relevant discursive practice. Instead it seems to have been taken as 
something far weaker—as a gentle request to “respect the local culture.” 
Such a request does not impose obligations on tourists to refrain from 
climbing; rather, tourists may decide for themselves whether to fulfill it.
It is fairly clear that until the recent closure of the Climb, the Aṉangu 
community’s claims were taken up as gentle requests by the communi-
ty’s most important interlocutors—including Parks Australia, tour oper-
ators, and tourists themselves. For instance, the fact that Parks Australia 
actively maintained the infrastructure dedicated to the climb—including 
securing the steel handrails, and placing a massive car park at its start-
ing point, not to mention a large sign that, weather permitting, simply 
announced “Climb Open”7—strongly suggests that it considered the 
Aṉangu’s claim more as a request for tourists to consider than a bind-
ing order.8 Moreover, tour operating companies serving Uluṟu would 
inform tourists of the Aṉangu’s stance vis-à-vis the climb, but tended 
to frame the issue as a question of personal choice about which “people 
should be allowed to make up their own mind” (James 2007, 404). In-
deed, certain tourist marketing materials even sought to cash in further, 
by “promot[ing] the sacredness of the site to Aṉangu as an enhancement 
of the visitor experience, rather than a governing Law to which visitors 
should adhere” (James 2007, 404).
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Perhaps the most striking evidence of the way the Aṉangu’s attempted 
imperative was taken up as a gentle request can be found in the testimony 
of visitors to Uluṟu. For instance, some visitors questioned the authority 
of the Aṉangu to so much as request that tourists refrain from climb-
ing (“I think it’s a crock of shit that they ask you not to climb. It’s our 
country too”9; “It’s Australia’s rock, not theirs […] I’ll climb the bloody 
rock if I want to”10). Others, such as Mike, a non-indigenous Australian 
visual artist in his 20s, acknowledged the Aṉangu’s “perspective” and 
the fact that they “say you’re not supposed to climb,” but evidently did 
not think any of this should govern his own behavior:
[INTERVIEWER]: How did the Aboriginal wishes and signage fit into your 
desire to climb?
MIKE: I think the fact they let you climb if you want is unto itself, is 
enough permission for me to be able to climb it, because I can ac-
knowledge it as a sacred site […] Actually standing on it, and feeling 
the energy gave me an appreciation for their perspective a bit more, 
even though they say you’re not supposed to climb it. I climbed it 
anyway. But, that’s just the way I am. I’m not going to not climb it.
(Figueroa and Waitt 2010, 151)
Kukla’s social normativism about speech acts, and the notion of discur-
sive injustice that it brings into view, provides a powerful framework 
for understanding what was going on in this case. What we see is that 
a speaker (in this case a group speaker, the Aṉangu community) is at-
tempting to perform a particular kind of speech act (here, an impera-
tive), by means of a conventional arrangement that really should get the 
job done (they have the authority to perform the act, and in attempting 
to perform it, put the right words in the right mouths). But something 
about their disempowered social identity (their status as an Indigenous 
community) affects the uptake their speech receives, with the result that 
the potency of their speech is radically undermined. In this case, they 
find that despite being the recognized owners of the land in question 
they are only able to make gentle requests, rather than issue binding 
orders, about activities on their land.
5.2 Entreaties to Speak: The Endorois Case
Kukla’s second example of discursive injustice involves not so much a 
misrecognition of the speaker’s act as a misrecognition of the status of 
the speaker herself. More specifically, it concerns situations in which a 
speaker attempts to perform an act within a given “discursive game” but 
is not recognized by the other participants as a fellow participant, that 
is, as someone entitled to make moves in that game. The result is that 
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the speaker’s attempt to make a move within a certain discursive game is 
taken up instead as the speaker petitioning for entry into the game—as 
what Kukla (2014) calls an “entreaty to speak.”
Kukla argues that this form of discursive injustice routinely affects 
women when they attempt to speak as experts within fields dominated 
by men. That is, despite meeting the relevant standards for counting 
as an expert in such a field, and therefore presuming to already have 
that status, women routinely find that “[their] speech is taken as an en-
treaty to speak as an expert rather than as expert speech” (Kukla 2014, 
449). As Kukla notes, this can produce a potentially damaging prag-
matic breakdown, since a speaker who takes herself to be speaking as 
an expert may speak in a manner that does “not do [her] any discursive 
favours”—the hard-earned confidence of the expert may seem unbecom-
ing when the speaker is cast in the role of a humble supplicant.
Here too, I think it is possible to identify a broadly similar phenom-
enon that undermines the speech of certain Indigenous communities. 
What I have in mind is cases in which these communities attempt 
to make claims and demands in terms of particular laws and legal 
instruments—but their claims and demands are treated as petitions for 
the very legal standing or recognition those claims presume. Hence in 
attempting to make moves as a participant within a discursive game, 
they are treated instead as seeking recognition as a participant with the 
standing to make those moves.
This phenomenon is well illustrated in a landmark legal case, En-
dorois Community v. Kenya11 that went to the African Commission on 
Human and Peoples’ Rights. The case concerned the displacement of the 
Endorois community from their traditional territory at Lake Bogoria in 
the Rift Valley by the Kenyan government, in order to make way for the 
establishment of a national park. Prior to their forced removal, the En-
dorois community had occupied and used the land around Lake Bogoria 
for over 300 years, and they were recognized by all neighboring com-
munities and tribes as the owners of that land. The land was key to their 
farming practices, and integral to their cultural and religious ceremonies 
(Endorois v. Kenya, par. 7).
The Endorois contended that a number of the collective rights they 
enjoy in terms of the African Charter had been violated when they 
were displaced from their traditional territory—specifically, the right 
to practice their religion (Article 8 of the African Charter), the right to 
property (Article 14), the right to culture (Article 17), the right to free 
disposition of natural resources (Article 21), and the right to develop-
ment (Article 22).
What is especially interesting about this case is that the centerpiece 
of Kenya’s response was not so much to answer or dispute the Endorois 
complaints on their own terms, but rather to challenge the Endorois 
community’s standing to make those complaints before the African 
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Commission. This is because the rights that the community claimed 
were violated were collective rights, and the standing to claim them be-
fore the African Commission is held by complainants only in virtue of 
their status as “a people.” So the State of Kenya challenged their status 
as a people, claiming that they were not “distinct” from other tribes in 
the area:
The Respondent State disputes that the Endorois are indeed a 
community / sub-tribe or clan on their own, and it argues that it 
is incumbent on the Complainants to prove that the Endorois are 
distinct from the other Tugen sub-tribe or indeed the larger Kalen-
jin tribe before they can proceed to make a case before the African 
Commission.
(Endorois v. Kenya, par. 142).
Here too I think the notion of discursive injustice can help to illumi-
nate a distinctive way in which the speech of Indigenous communities 
is sometimes undermined. What is particularly interesting in this case is 
that the speech of the community is undermined qua group speech, since 
it is precisely their status as a group with its own collective identity—a 
status which entitles them to make certain speech acts this context—that 
is challenged. Like Kukla’s example of women who attempt to speak as 
experts but are heard instead as making entreaties, here the Endorois 
community attempt to make a number of substantive legal claims, only 
to have their entitlement as a (group) speaker called into question. There 
are a number of disanalogies between Kukla’s example and this case,12 
but the common element is that, for certain speakers, their standing to 
participate in certain discursive practices is always treated as in doubt, 
and open to challenge, with the result that their participation in those 
practices is seldom straightforward and seamless. Just as women experts 
need to constantly entreat others for recognition as experts before their 
expert speech can be recognized as such, so too must Indigenous com-
munities prove their collective identity and their Indigenous bona fides 
(their “cultural distinctiveness,” etc.) before their legal claims will be 
properly heard.
5.3 Assertives vs. Expressives: The Sarayaku Case
The third example of discursive injustice that Kukla describes involves 
cases in which speakers’ attempts to make assertions—that is, claims 
about how things are objectively, in the world—are heard instead as ex-
pressives, i.e., as purely subjective expressions of the speaker’s emotional 
state or feelings. As Kukla argues, the key pragmatic difference between 
assertives and expressives is the epistemic import they have for others. 
An assertion is a claim about how things are in the objective, shared 
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world. When such a claim is justified, it gives reason for others to believe 
its content; when it is not entitled, or when its entitlement is in question, 
it calls for reasoned denial or rational challenge. In these ways it makes a 
distinctive kind of epistemic claim on others. By contrast, an expressive 
may call for sympathy or toleration, but it does not call for agreement or 
challenge in the same way:
[an expressive] makes no particular epistemic claim on me. It doesn’t 
even make sense for me to ask whether I agree or disagree with it, 
or whether it reflects the world correctly. There is no point in my 
arguing with you about whether you should have it; it is merely an 
expression of feelings, disconnected from rational discourse.
(Kukla 2014, 451)
According to Kukla, this kind of discursive injustice often affects the 
speech of women when they attempt to call out sexist behavior. Kukla 
gives the example of a female employee who makes a report of sexual 
harassment, i.e., makes a claim about certain facts in the world, namely 
that certain inappropriate behavior occurred, and yet is heard instead as 
making wholly subjective claim: “‘My boss is inappropriately flirtatious 
with me’ is received as some kind of expression of a feeling of discom-
fort” (Kukla 2014, 452). This kind of discursive injustice is particularly 
pernicious, since it not only undermines the particular speaker on each 
occasion, but also, as Kukla indicates, it shields from view the problem 
that should be revealed by their claims taken collectively:
when women point out the same kinds of incidents over and again, 
the evidence ought to build that we have systematic sexism on our 
hands. Instead, the case seems to need to be made from scratch on 
each occasion […] in part because women’s claims to sexist treat-
ment aren’t taken as building on one another as part of a shared 
picture of the world in the way that they should be.
(Kukla 2014, 452)
Here too, I think a similar phenomenon affects the speech of Indigenous 
communities. The phenomenon is especially noticeable in a number of 
legal cases concerning industrial development on traditional Indigenous 
territory. In the cases I have in mind, Indigenous communities appear 
to attempt to make assertions—claims about how things really are—
but are heard instead as making a different kind of claim, claims about 
their cultural beliefs or “worldview.” For instance, in a case that went 
to the US Supreme Court, Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protec-
tive Association,13 Indigenous groups objected to the construction of a 
logging road, which they claimed would desecrate sacred land.14 The 
Court decided that the road could nonetheless be constructed, since its 
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construction would not interfere with the Indigenous people’s cultural 
belief that the land was sacred. Like the expressives discussed by Kukla, 
such claims of cultural belief or worldview stand in sharp contrast to 
straightforward assertions, since they, like expressives, make no general 
epistemic claim on others—they can simply be tolerated without need 
for agreement or rational challenge.
A good example of the way Indigenous communities sometimes at-
tempt to make direct assertions but are heard instead as making state-
ments of cultural belief or worldview can be found in a case that went to 
the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, Kichwa People of Sarayaku 
vs. State of Ecuador.15 The case was about Ecuador’s award of an oil 
exploration concession on the traditional territory of the Kichwa com-
munity of Sarayaku. The Kichwa community claimed they had not been 
properly consulted in accordance with international law before the con-
cession was awarded, and, ultimately, the Court agreed, finding in their 
favor.16
In the course of the proceedings, the Court took the unusual step of 
conducting a site visit, traveling to the Sarayaku region to themselves 
consult with the Kichwa community. It is the way the Court hears the 
testimony of community leaders given during this site visit that is worth 
highlighting. During the site visit, the yachak of the Kichwa people, Sa-
bino Gualinga, stated that, “Sarayaku is a living land, a living jungle; 
there are trees, medicinal plants and other types of beings there.” In 
other testimony he had described different “pachas” of the world, in-
cluding one at a subterranean level: “Beneath the ground, ucupacha, 
there are people living as they do here. There are beautiful towns down 
there, and there are trees, lakes and mountains.”17 The president of the 
Kichwa community, José Gualinga, emphasized the importance of the 
forest to the community, claiming that “[the forest] gives us the power, 
potential and energy that is vital to our survival and life. And everything 
is interconnected with the lagoons, the mountains, the trees, the beings 
and also us as an exterior living being.”18
These claims appear to be both conventionally marked and intended 
as group assertions—that is, as the Kichwa community’s assertions 
about the state of their natural environment. They are made by autho-
rized spokespersons for the Kichwa people, who were being called upon 
by the Court to speak in the name of their community, and both their 
content and the conversational context in which they are made (i.e., ex-
plaining the Kichwa people’s opposition to drilling under the ground 
and destroying parts of the forest) suggest that they are apt to be inter-
preted as claims about the natural environment.
Yet, strikingly, the Court does not take up these claims in this way. 
Instead, it takes them up as claims about the Kichwa’s cultural beliefs. 
This is evident from the section of the Court’s judgment in which the tes-
timony of the Kichwa elders is featured. Without appearing to evaluate 
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the truth of their testimony—without accepting or denying that there are 
mountains and lakes under the ground, that everything in the forest is 
interconnected, etc.—it simply concludes that:
the Kichwa people have a profound and special relationship with 
their ancestral territory, which […] encompasses their own world-
view and cultural and spiritual identity.
(Sarayaku v. Ecuador, par. 155)
As in Kukla’s example, this case seems to involve a speaker’s would-be 
assertions being taken in a way that strips them of their epistemic im-
port. In this case, the community’s attempts to assert are not taken up 
as acts that make an epistemic claim on others, calling for “agreement 
or rational challenge,” but only as expressions of the community’s 
worldview—of what is, as it were, “true for them.” Although the Court 
in this case goes to great lengths to give the community a say, this way 
of hearing Indigenous speech is not empowering but marginalizing—it 
treats Indigenous communities as profoundly “other” and outside the 
space of reasons.
6 Conclusion
Recent feminist philosophy of language has drawn attention to the poli-
tics of uptake—to the way the social reception of speech can sometimes 
be unjust and disempowering to the speaker. My modest aim in this 
chapter has been to apply some recent thinking in this broad tradition to 
some recent treatments of Indigenous speech. More specifically, I have 
sought to show how the social normativist framework developed by 
Kukla and Lance—and especially the concept of “discursive injustice” 
that it brings into view—can help to illuminate some of the ways that 
the speech of Indigenous communities is given unjust uptake. I think 
the three examples I have given exemplify more widespread practices 
whose causes, character and consequences deserve close and sustained 
attention—but I leave a fuller treatment for future work.19
Notes
 1 The notion of silencing has been developed extensively within a broadly Aus-
tinian framework by Jennifer Hornsby and Rae Langton (see Langton 1993, 
Hornsby 1995, Hornsby & Langton 1998). See also more recent work by 
Ishani Maitra (2009), Kristie Dotson (2011), Mary Kate McGowan (2019), 
and Laura Caponetto (2020). The notion of discursive injustice, which is my 
primary focus here, has been developed by Kukla (2014), as well as Tanne-
sini (2016, 2020).
 2 See, e.g., Brandom (1994), Kukla and Lance (2009, 2013), MacFarlane 
(2011).
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 3 See, esp. Langton (1993) and Hornsby (1995).
 4 See Lackey (2018) and Tollefsen (2020) for discussion of both of these forms 
of group speech.
 5 See also Lance and Kukla (2013).
 6 Thanks to Trystan Goetze for bringing this example to my attention. 
 7 For discussion of the “Climb open” sign and contradictory messaging it cre-
ated, see Hueneke and Baker (2009, 486).
 8 As Figueroa and Waitt (2010, 144) put it: “The material and cultural re-
sources sacrificed for the climb are quite exceptional given the primary prin-
ciple to ‘Never Climb’. Indeed, any visitor passing the foot of the climb is 
confronted with a moral contradiction foregrounded by the billboard de-
claring, in many languages, the Tjurkurpa law against climbing and back-
grounded by the evidence of ceaseless colonial habits sketched across the 
spine of Uluru in the shape of a singular scar left as a legacy for the present 
and (unfortunately) future climbers to endeavor.”
 9 James (2007, 401).
 10 Hueneke and Baker (2009, 484).
 11 Centre for Minority Rights Development & Minority Rights Group Inter-
national on behalf of the Endorois Community v. The Republic of Kenya 
[2009] 276/2003.
 12 One key difference is that the “discursive game” in question has a different 
structure. The participants in this game (the African Commission, the State 
of Kenya, and the Endorois Community) have quite different roles, respon-
sibilities and entitlements from one another, and in seeking to make claims 
within this discursive game, the Endorois are not presuming to have the 
same authority as the other participants.
 13 Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Association [1988] 485 US 
439 (Supreme Court of the USA). 
 14 This case, and a few others featuring similar judicial reasoning, is discussed 
by Tsosie (2017).
 15 Kichwa People of Sarayaku vs. State of Ecuador [2012] Series C No. 245. 
 16 In previous work (Townsend 2020; Townsend & Townsend 2020), I have 
discussed this case with reference to the notion of ‘silencing’. 
 17 Sarayaku v. Ecuador, par 150. 
 18 Sarayaku v. Ecuador, par 152. 
 19 Work on this chapter was supported by funding from the Austrian Science 
Fund (FWF), grant number P33682-G. Thanks to Dina Lupin Townsend, 
Trystan Goetze, Hans Bernhard Schmid, Jeremy Wanderer, and two review-
ers for helpful feedback on earlier drafts. 
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